1 This new approach to negotiations is sometimes referred to as principled or interest-based negotiations (Fisher and Ury, 1981) ; integrative bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Pruitt, 1980) or mutual-gains bargaining (Raiffa, 19883; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987) . While these labels have slightly different meanings, the core of the processes are similar. We use these terms interchangeably to refer to a form of negotiation in which parties focus on interests, look for ways to expand resources, and focus on tactics other than power to find agreements that provide gain for all parties.
While the primary teams need to coordinate internally, they also need to coordinate with the other primary team: they need to work with the opponent. We label this larger group, which includes primary negotiating teams from both sides, the integrating team.
In most negotiations, including labor negotiations, the primary teams function at arm's-length most of the time and only occasionally cohere into an integrated group.
Finally, each primary team (and the integrated team) has a relationship it must manage with its "second table," the constituents who have ultimate authority over the terms of an agreement. The exact nature of that authority varies a great deal.
In traditional collective bargaining, the authority relationship between management-primary teams and their constituent groups is based primarily on hierarchy, while the authority relationship between union-primary teams and their constituents is based primarily on politics. These arrangements affect the ways in which constituent groups are involved and consulted.
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) introduces into this pattern of relations a new set of ideas and processes. MGB suggests a focus on interests and not positions, on inventing options for mutual gain rather than haggling over a fixed amount of resources, and on judging these options according to objective criteria instead of relying heavily on bargaining power to influence outcomes. In other words, negotiators are urged to engage in a process of joint problem solving in order to fashion agreements that maximize gains for both parties.
Normative models of mutual-gains bargaining describe a set of steps for carrying out this type of negotiation. Typically, parties are advised to establish an agenda that begins with mutual sharing of interests, followed by collective "brainstorming" to identify creative ways of satisfying these interests and of establishing criteria by which possible ideas can be evaluated. This process is intended to result in agreements that meet the interests of the various parties (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987) .
But MGB does not just introduce new concepts and steps; it creates and depends on a pattern of group dynamics that is different from traditional bargaining.
In order for MGB to be successful group norms within primary teams must change to allow for broader participation.
In addition, the integrated team must develop dynamics which are less cautious, become a place where interests are shared, and become more prominent in comparison to the primary team. This change, in turn, has an impact on how primary teams work. And, as more new ideas are generated, the nature and intensity of relations between primary teams and constituent groups need to be changed; the teams are under increased pressure to bring their constituents along in a process that is really being designed as it occurs.
The elements of the MGB process, while well defined in theory, provide little guidance once the parties actually begin negotiating. It is at this point that individual bargainers move into a group context, within their own team and across the table,
and that the group dynamics can contribute to--or detract from--the problem solving. From a group perspective, the model should address the following:
(1) the underlying individual and organizing dynamics that mark the early phases of group activity, specifically the development of group norms, that impact how the group does its work (Bettinghausen and Murnighan, 1985; Schein, 1988) ;
(2) the importance of the middle stages of a group's life as an occasion for change in its normative and task structure (Gersick, 1989) ; and (3) the tension between developing the internal processes of the team and managing the relationships between external groups that will influence the group's product (Ancona, 1990) .
MGB differs significantly from traditional collective bargaining in terms of the demands it makes on the relationships within the primary negotiating teams, the integrated team, and constituent groups. We will explore these differences in the context of these three group perspectives.
We will use data from ongoing field experiments in mutual-gains bargaining to describe the ways these issues manifest themselves and the dilemmas they create. Finally, drawing from the study of groups in others contexts, we will suggest ways in which principles of group process may be used to resolve these dilemmas.
Data and Methodology
The data used in this analysis is drawn from observations of three negotiations that took place in the United States in the late 1980's, (the names have been changed to preserve confidentiality). In each case, negotiators attempted to implement mutual-gains bargaining. We will not try to present a comprehensive analysis of these cases; instead we will draw from them to illustrate the ways in which group dynamics in negotiations affect, and are affected by, a mutual-gains approach to bargaining.
In the first case, which we will call Northwest, Inc., mutual-gains bargaining was effectively implemented, albeit in the face of great resistance from some constituents, and an agreement was reached by the appointed deadline. Mutual-gains bargaining was initiated after extensive meetings between constituents months before negotiations began, training included one phase attended by constituents and another for negotiators alone, and most of the negotiators supported mutual-gains bargaining.
The actual negotiations, as in the other cases, lasted for several months.
There was a great deal of open discussion during negotiations, as well as plenty of frustration and conflict. Most people on both sides strongly supported the final agreement and the MGB process. We observed this negotiation from beginning to end.
In the second case, Southwest, Inc., the mutual-gains approach worked well during the first half of negotiations, but was effectively abandoned halfway through. In the end, the parties reached an impasse, and the union struck for three weeks.
The mutual-gains process at Southwest was initiated over a year before actual negotiations, and included three separate training sessions. The first included negotiators and constituents; the others were for negotiators only. Both during training and in negotiations many constituents were ambivalent about the MGB process. A major influence in these negotiations was resistance from the company's corporate headquarters, and from the union's national leadership. In this case, we observed the training, and interviewed the negotiators during and after negotiations.
In the third case, Eastern, Inc., MGB was not effectively implemented at any time during negotiations. Instead, the negotiators reverted to traditional negotiations almost immediately. However, the effort did take some of the "edge" from the negotiations, and the parties did reach an agreement and did feel that the relationships had not been damaged by negotiations. Training for this company began several months before negotiations, but it did not include constituents, and there was great controversy within the union about attending the training. In the last week before negotiations began, a new person was assigned to lead negotiations for the union. We were able to observe most of these negotiations from beginning to end.
In all three cases, the training occurred at off-site meetings.
It included general presentations of the core ideas of MGB, negotiating simulations designed to illustrate those ideas, and, for the actual negotiators, an all-day bargaining simulation that gave people a chance to practice the MGB ideas that they were learning. The training also included explicit discussions about the merits of MGB compared with traditional negotiations, and some actual negotiations over the process they would use to negotiate. Anxiety over group membership may begin even before formal meetings commence. Members worry about their role in the group, the control they will be able to exert, and whether they will be accepted (Schein, 1988) . These individual concerns constitute the unconscious or emotional life of the group, which is often ignored as the group sets out to work. Yet these concerns often lead to behaviors vis a vis other group members that make getting started difficult and that interfere with rational task functioning (Bion, 1961 , Rioch, 1975 . Schein (1988) suggests that these issues of identity, control, and acceptance must be resolved before members can fully engage in the task of the group.
Members are concerned with establishing "identity" in the group. They need to figure out the roles they will play on the team ---whether they will be outspoken or quiet, aggressive or humorous, a leader or a follower. As members concentrate on these issues and work through the possibilities, their ability to listen and participate is often curtailed. Concerns about authority and influence also affect behavior in the early stages of a group. Members attend to the early dynamics in order to determine who will be in a controlling position and who will be influenced by others. As a result, early stages are often marked by testing of oneself and others to see where authority and influence lie. These periods may be marked by conflict among members over seemingly inconsequential things. It is important to understand, however, that these conflicts involve establishing power and position as much as they involve disagreement over substantive issues.
Finally, members are always concerned about whether their individual goals will be congruent with those of the group, and whether they will be accepted by the members. These concerns are enacted during periods of high participation followed by those marked with periods of a quiet "wait and see" attitude, as members test to see how their input is received. Here again, group progress may follow the rhythms of member comfort rather than task work.
Individual concerns are often ignored as the team meets and begins to carry out its task. Previous research has shown that teams develop norms about their work, interpersonal relations, and relations with the host organization quickly, sometimes within the first few minutes of their first meeting (Ancona, 1980; Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985; Gersick, 1988) . These norms evolve from a combination of individual member experience and that which the group develops as a whole. Team members bring familiar scripts from other group experiences to a new group situation, and these scripts give members a sequence of activity to follow in new and uncertain situations (Abelson, 1976; Taylor, Crocker, D'Agostino, 1978) . In other words, a group's process is never a tabula rasa; its foundation is built on the existing scripts of the group members.
Early anxiety to make some progress pushes team members to follow existing scripts and to begin work quickly by assigning roles and responsibilities. This "solution mindedness" (Hoffman about what norms of behavior and social order will emerge. In traditional labor negotiations, this concern is heightened by the high stakes involved in the bargaining and because, for many team members, bargaining is not part of a regular job. Collective bargaining is carried out, therefore, in a highly charged atmosphere marked by pressure, uncertainty and complexity.
In traditional negotiations, some clarity is provided by the existence of broadly understood scripts for negotiating which are reinforced by leaders and individuals who have been through negotiations before (Friedman, 1989 Supporting these norms is a social order that structures relationships within and between groups in negotiations (Friedman and Gal, 1990) . There is strict hierarchical control within the primary team, and opposition between primary teams (the integrated team is not legitimate); members of the primary team are agents representing (and under the control of) constituents.
This social order maintains the control over information and impressions that is the core of traditional bargaining. It also provides a clear notion of who is in control, who sets the norms, and whom to trust.
Getting started in mutual gains bargaining.
In mutual gains bargaining, the development of norms is complicated for two reasons. First, the desired norms of interaction are different.
Members of the integrated team need to reveal and explain their underlying interests and discuss options for addressing those interests. Second, existing scripts and power structures based on traditional norms will drive behavior unless there are explicit efforts to shape norms in an alternative direction.
This tendency results from lack of experience with a new process and the need to reduce ambiguity; negotiators return to familiar and comfortable scripts.
In order for mutual-gains bargaining to work, a new set of norms needs to emerge and emerge early. It is in the earliest stages of bargaining that the negotiations path is determined. This is when groups struggle not only with the concepts of mutual-gains bargaining but also over its implications for their own behavior and control needs. These struggles occur during training and continue into the early stages of bargaining. The norms, whether they support mutual-gains bargaining or not, emerge from these dynamics.
Joint training is a common method of introducing labor and management to mutual-gains bargaining. It brings them together off-site to learn the principles of mutual-gains bargaining, to discuss how they will negotiate, and to practice by using bargaining simulations (often switching roles). It is a time when members learn new skills, obviously, but training is also the first time the differences between the traditional and the mutual-gains bargaining scripts are played out. Thus as the groups go through training, they confront issues of dominance, control, and habit, and they develop ---either implicitly or explicitly ---the guidelines that will mark their negotiations. Following the midpoint revolution, teams go back to incremental adjustments along the lines set by the midpoint change.
The concept of the midpoint revolution was "discovered" in a study of eight temporary task forces, that had explicit deadlines (Gersick 1988 Teams sometimes fail to carry out this midpoint change because of their organizational contexts (Ancona 1990; Hackman, 1990) . In the two cases where mutual-gains bargaining was actually used, the experiences were quite different. At Northwest, about halfway through negotiations, bargainers began to worry about whether they would be able to finish by the deadline. During the first month of negotiations, norms supported discussing things openly, sharing ideas, and avoiding premature criticism of options. But nothing had been decided. Because mutual-gains bargaining was taken seriously, more issues were raised than normal and more ideas (including radical ones) were generated;
and negotiators tried to judge these ideas using objective criteria. All of these factors created more work for negotiators, stretching their capacity to collect relevant data.
When negotiators began to realize this, panic set in.
At this point the issue that had dominated the first days of negotiations reemerged: how do we do mutual-gains bargaining?
The negotiators agreed they had reached a different phase. While they had learned how to discuss interests and generate options, they had not yet experienced packaging and deciding. Each primary team had different ideas on how to deal with this problem.
In the face of this pressure, the integrated team at Northwest asked the mutual-gains bargaining trainer for assistance. He supported one side's proposal that they break up into subcommittees that would specialize in different issues.
This would allow for more efficient use of time, and for the development of expertise in certain areas (health insurance provisions, for example, were difficult to master). At this point, small groups worked intensively to eliminate unrealistic options, decide on concrete numbers, and make relevant tradeoffs.
The midpoint shift was productive.
In contrast, at Southwest, the teams reverted to the traditional script at the midpoint. About halfway through negotiations, "pre-bargaining" ended and "bargaining" began. Ironically, however, teams following a traditional approach may shift to using elements of mutual-gains bargaining at the midpoint (Putnam, forthcoming).
In one case not in our study, the union backed out of joint training in mutual-gains bargaining, while management attended. Negotiators initially used the traditional approach.
In one subcommittee where progress was stymied, a management negotiator suggested that they try using some elements of mutual-gains bargaining. The integrated team agreed and spent several days brainstorming for innovative ways to solve a sales commission formula problem.
This process helped, but members of the integrated team agreed that too little was done, too late. A switch to mutual-gains bargaining can occur at the midpoint, but it is more likely that external pressures, time constraints, and a focus on financial issues will drive out mutual-gains bargaining at this point.
Balancinq Internal and External Group Processes
When parties engage in mutual gains bargaining, the relationships between the primary, integrated, and constituent groups is more complicated than they are in traditional bargaining. Each team must manage not only its own internal dynamics but also the interactions with the other groups.
Research on other types of teams (new product teams, consulting teams, and top management teams) suggests that the management of these external relationships is more predictive of performance than is its internal dynamics (Ancona, 1990: Ancona and Caldwell, 1989; Pennings, 1980; Pfeffer, 1986) .
Teams facing the same tasks within the same organizations still make very different decisions about how to allocate time
between internal and external activities. Groups use three major strategies to define their initiatives toward outside groups (Ancona, 1990 For teams whose success depends on outsider support or acceptance (such as the ratification requirement of collective bargaining), a probing strategy seems to result in the highest performance.
Internally oriented informing teams are most likely to fail because their work is insulated from critical constituencies. They may develop an outstanding product or process, but it will never be accepted or implemented because of resistance among constituent groups. Probing teams, however, do pay a price for their success.
In the short term, members of these teams experience confusion, unclear goals, and dissatisfaction with the work of the group. Because these team members are actively engaged in trying to understand external views, they bring diverse opinions and perspectives into the team, which in turn exacerbates the conflict and confusion attending any group effort. However, as teams learn to work with this ambiguity and develop ways of dealing with conflict, they eventually become the higher performers (Ancona, 1990) .
Teams can use a probing strategy to handle interdependence and coordination with other groups. In all three cases, negotiators faced pressures from constituents even before negotiations began. At Northwest, constituents allowed negotiators to commit to training only after they agreed to set an early deadline for negotiations so that, if mutual-gains bargaining did not work, they would still have time to negotiate in the traditional manner. At Southwest, initial constituent worries were deflected when the negotiators said that the mutual-gains bargaining approach would only be used during "pre-bargaining." The group would then revert to traditional bargaining when real negotiations began. In both cases, negotiators had to convince constituents that traditional bargaining was not precluded by trying mutual-gains bargaining.
When negotiations began, constituent expectations and misunderstanding of mutual-gains bargaining continued to constrain negotiators. Before the MGB approach was completely scuttled at Eastern, union constituents insisted that their demands be presented to management. The primary union team understood that these demands were traditional "positions," not a list of "interests" (the beginning point for mutual-gains bargaining discussions), but they felt compelled to make the presentation anyway. They tried to skirt the problem by claiming, "We are just doing this for our members, then we can do 28 III mutual-gains bargaining."
However, it was hard to develop a mutual-gains bargaining approach once the stage had been set by these demands. A similar problem occurred at Northwest. Even though a broad range of constituents from both sides attended the first day of training, they did not understand the distinction between interests and positions. As a result, the list of "interests" presented by the union to management were seen as inappropriate by management negotiators, and, an indication of the union's inability to do mutual-gains bargaining.
Constituents also resisted mutual-gains bargaining because it generated innovative options that they had not foreseen or approved.
Once bargainers understood brainstorming, they became excited about the process and generated new ideas. Inevitably they found themselves too far ahead of their constituents. They discussed ideas that were not "approved" by constituents and, when word got out that new, "dangerous" proposals were being negotiated, constituent monitoring intensified. At Northwest, the lead union bargainer faced an angry constituent-advisory group member, who complained that the advisory group was not needed if the primary team could launch into new areas without their approval. On the management side, the president and other members of the senior management team often rejected new ideas.
Similarly, at Southwest, when top managers and union leaders heard that some temporary agreements were being reached in subcommittee meetings, they quickly rejected the agreements.
In mutual-gains bargaining, negotiators are caught between constituent expectations that they will be kept informed on every In mutual-gains bargaining, some basic tenets of traditional constituent management are violated: the primary teams become an integrated team, raising constituent suspicion; radical rather than incremental changes are discussed; and information flows freely, to constituents as well as to opponents, so that it is more difficult to manage constituent impressions of the content and process of negotiations. In traditional bargaining the negotiating group has a process for managing its relationships across boundaries. Those who use mutual-gains bargaining will need to create a new way to balance the tension between informing and probing.
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III
Conclusions
Theory in mutual-gains bargaining generally presumes that negotiators act as unitary actors. Group dynamics is a relatively understudied and undertheorized dimension of negotiation. As a result, the prescriptive advice that comes from theory and practice tends to focus on the individual levels.
Based on this exploration of group process, it is possible to supplement existing normative theory with recommendations aimed at the group level. Many of these recommendations presume either that an outside interventionist is present, or that an insider takes the lead in introducing changes.
Assistance in Getting Started.
Getting started requires attention to individual members' concerns about their position, authority, and acceptance. These concerns are likely to be most pronounced among leaders and others who will perceive that mutual-gains bargaining erodes their power and influence. Assistance in getting started must ensure the development of norms that support mutual-gains bargaining, not traditional models.
It is clear that the individual concerns of members regarding identity, acceptance, and authority need to be addressed if the primary and integrated groups are to function effectively. Members need to get to know each other, to test one another, and to find their place in the group process. Until they do so, they will be unlikely to map out a reasonable approach to negotiations, create a realistic agenda, or share the kinds of information required for mutual-gains bargaining.
These concerns can be addressed in a variety of ways. Any occasion that provide opportunities for members to interact and get to know each other will ease some of the concerns and anxieties experienced in the early stages. Preliminary meetings held to plan upcoming negotiations or to share information also
give members an opportunity to test and get to know each other. While formal meetings are important, some of these issues can be worked out in informal get-togethers away from the immediate demands of the moment. Dinners, drinks, and volleyball games give people an opportunity to step out of role and get to know each other on a more personal basis (Friedman and Gal, 1989; Kolb and Coolidge, 1988 an ongoing process; it should also be started early, before blocking groups have an opportunity to mobilize against an option. Many teams generate excellent ideas only to be criticized or even disowned by constituent groups when those ideas are presented. Those external groups need to get used to the new ideas and to feel as if they had a part in shaping them.
In the short term, testing may demotivate the team, as many of their ideas may be derided or actually vetoed. To avoid constituent testing, however, is to pay a high price later in the negotiations.
Inventing options through brainstorming is typically seen as a task that occupies the integrated group or subcommittees of its members. For probing teams, however, brainstorming becomes an activity for both the integrated and the constituent groups.
Both sets of groups can produce, criticize, and evaluate ideas and options. It is a well-known phenomenon that ideas are more easily accepted when people feel that they have participated in their production. Therefore, bringing a wider range of stakeholders into the brainstorming process increases the probability that those ideas will eventually be implemented. 
